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I. INTRODUCTION
The literature of the legal profession speaks of "professional
independence" or "independence of the bar" as an important or "core"
professional value or attribute, one that the bar should fight to preserve.
* Stein Chair and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham Univ. School of Law.
This article grows out of a presentation on November 9, 2012, as part of the Distinguished Lecture
Series of the Akron Law Joseph G. Miller and William C. Becker Center for Professional
Responsibility. I am grateful to the Center; its director, Frank Quirk, and faculty director, Professor
John P. Sahl; and the University of Akron School of Law, for the opportunity to make the
presentation. For helpful suggestions on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Professor Sahl; to Michele
DeStefano and Rebecca Roiphe; to participants in the faculty workshop at University of Georgia
School of Law; and to my Fordham colleagues Aditi Bagchi, Nestor Davidson, Howard Erichson,
Clare Huntington, Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, Russ Pearce, and Ben Zipursky.
1. Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, in THE
LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 23, 24 (1984)
("The professional independence of the practicing lawyer is the single most important element in
providing the legal profession with its strength, character, and integrity. . . . A lawyer is
independent when free to perform his or her professional obligations objectively, not only to clients,
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The term has been invoked in the professional literature, including,
notably, in a 1984 collection of essays by four leading practitioners, one
a barrister and the others members of the U.S. bar.2 The idea of
"independence" has also been explored in the academic literature,
including in a seminal article by Yale law professor and legal historian
Robert Gordon,3 who identified "the praise of independence [and] the
fear of its decline" as "one of the great epic themes of professional
rhetoric."4
Peter Margulies has observed that the term is amorphous.' We
have a much better sense of what we mean when we talk about 'judicial
independence," although even there, understandings have evolved over
time and leave room for debate.6 In contrast, it may not even be clear
but also to the court and to the public interest."); Alfred P. Carlton Jr., The Road Ahead: On Culture
and Commitment, 89 A.B.A. J. 8 (Aug. 2003) ("It is a time for us to hold fast to the core values of
our profession and to jealously guard our professional independence."); Robert J. Grey Jr., Passing
the Gavel, Keeping Our Purpose: Lawyers, Remember It's Your Job to Support Rights of the
Judiciary and Legal Profession, 91 A.B.A. J. 6 (Aug. 2005) ("It is in our professional best interest,
and in the best interest of our profession's future, that we engage in meaningful work to maintain
our professional independence, which is the only means by which we gain and hold the public's
trust.").
2. THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE
CHALLENGES (1984) (collecting essays by Robert S. Alexander, Peter Megargee Brown, Archibald
Cox, and Robert B. McKay). See also The LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL
REVISITED (John B. Davidson ed. 1985); Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional
Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2003).
3. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988). For
additional academic discussions, see, for example, William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a
Business Lawyer's Duty of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I (2004); John S. Dzienkowski &
Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81
TEX. L. REV. 405 (2002); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179 (2000); Suzanne Le Mire,
Testing Times: In-House Counsel and Independence, 14 LEGAL ETHICS 21 (2011); Peter Margulies,
Lawyers' Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct,
Terrorism and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 943-47 (2006); Kevin H. Michaels,
Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85 (2010);
Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1931 (2008).
4. Gordon, supra note 3, at 5, 6.
5. See Margulies, supra note 3, at 939 ("Lawyers' independence has been much celebrated
but little observed. . . . [T]he fault lies with our amorphous definition of independence.").
6. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes:
Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (2003); Stephen B. Burbank, What Do
We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003); Viet D. Dinh, Threats to
Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929 (2007); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca
Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution ofJudicial Independence,
64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 497 (2009); J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of
the Judiciary: Independence from What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241 (2001);
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian ofJudicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
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into what category lawyers' independence falls. Is it an attribute of
character, like "professional integrity," a state of mind like objectivity or
detachment, or a standard of conduct like avoidance of conflicts of
interest or preserving client confidences? Is it an aspiration like
"professional excellence" or an obligation like "professional
competence"? Is it a collective trait or an individual trait (or both)? The
term turns out to be elusive, in part, because it has multiple meanings;'
in part, because the various meanings are vague and not well elaborated;
and, in part, because the various meanings seem to be inconsistent with
each other or internally contradictory.8 Margulies argues that it is
quixotic to seek the real meaning of independence and that the term
should be replaced by others. 9 While that may be so, an exploration of
the shifting meanings of professional independence may provide some
insights into the evolution of bench-bar relationships and professional
regulation.
This article begins with some reflections on the principal meanings
REV. 644 (1999); see generally Amy B. Atchison, Lawrence Tobe Liebert & Denise K. Russell,
Bibliography, Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999). In general, judicial independence has both a negative and positive
connotation. From a negative perspective, judges should be free from the improper outside
influence of others, including other government officials or branches, third parties, and self-interest.
From a positive one, judges act based on their own best professional judgment-that is, they should
objectively interpret the law, objectively apply law to fact, and conduct proceedings in accordance
with conventional expectations of fairness and impartiality. Further, we understand that judicial
conduct rules are designed not so much to dictate that judges act independently in an affirmative
sense but to secure their independence by protecting judges from outside pressures and influences,
including those which judges themselves might invite. For example, the rules limit judges' work
and relationships that might lead them to compromise their independence and require judges to
recuse themselves from cases where their independence might reasonably be questioned. See
generally Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should
Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions ofJudicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
941 (2002).
7. Gordon, supra note 3, at 5-6; see also Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver
Lining in the Very Black Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 553-54 (2002) (concept includes
"independence from influences that would compromise our ardor for our clients," "independence
from the client," and "lawyer self-regulation").
8. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 19-20 ("In grappling with defined problems of
professional obligation, lawyers differ greatly on how much stress to give each of the two basic and
fundamentally conflicting ideals of political independence. One stresses loyalty to the client, even
at the cost of some warping of the legal framework. The other emphasizes fidelity to the framework
and its improvement, even at the cost of sometimes having to resist the pressures of clients."); Le
Mire, supra note 3, at 22, 30-37 (identifying four aspects of independence, but arguing that the most
important is "a personal capacity to exercise independent judgment"); Margulies, supra note 3, at
945 (describing why "independence is a rhetorical construct that masks conflicting values").
9. Margulies, supra note 3, at 981 ("Lawyers' independence is a good slogan in times when




of professional independence, as that term is conventionally employed.
Part II discusses the bar's collective independence to regulate its
members. Part III discusses individual lawyers' independence in the
context of professional representations, including independence from
clients, on one hand, and independence from third parties, on the other.
Part IV then suggests that there is a meaning of lawyers' professional
independence that has largely dropped out of lawyers' discourse but that
deserves more attention, namely, lawyers' independence from the
courts. This includes at least three aspects: (1) freedom to criticize
judges; (2) freedom to disobey arguably unlawful court orders; and (3)
freedom to resolve certain ethical dilemmas for oneself, as a matter of
professional conscience. As the bar has become strongly identified and
allied with the judiciary, motivated by the interests in securing judicial
protection from other government regulation and in securing the bar's
own institutional influence over individual lawyers, it has ignored this
understanding and redefined professional independence consistently
with a strong judicial role in regulating lawyers.
II. PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION: LAWYERS' COLLECTIVE
"INDEPENDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT DOMINATION"
One use of the term "professional independence" refers to lawyers'
collective and (relatively) exclusive right to make and enforce the
applicable standards of conduct. In the contemporary rhetoric of the bar,
the bar's power to regulate itself plays a supporting role to lawyers'
individual independence in the course of their legal work, but an
important role nonetheless. For example, the U.S. organized bar has
sometimes come to the defense of lawyers in repressive regimes when it
believes that the foreign bar's independence, in this respect, is being
threatened. 10
10. See, e.g., Press Release, William T. Robinson, Ill, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement
Re: Threats to the Independence of Belarus' Legal Profession (June 19, 2012):
The American Bar Association is concerned about violations of international law in
Belarus that present ongoing threats to the independence of the legal profession. . . .
Belarus' retaliation against lawyers for representing political opponents and human
rights activists, and the country's interference with the administration of the Minsk Bar
Association, contravenes fundamental human rights enshrined in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The government of Belarus has also violated the
right to freedom of expression by retaliating against lawyers speaking on behalf of their
clients, and it has violated the right of these lawyers to associate with colleagues and
clients without undue interference. These developments are in clear breach of the legal
profession's core principles, namely the independent regulation of the practice of law
recognized in Europe, the United States and internationally.
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The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") focuses on the "independence" of the bar in this sense:
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional
calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-
regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence
from government domination. An independent legal profession is an
important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members
are not dependent on government for the right to practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special
responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility
to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and
not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. 1
The Model Rules might be thought to reflect the organized bar's
principal effort at self-regulation. This codification of rules, designed
for adoption by state courts, reflects the bar's view of the optimal
professional norms, mediating among the various roles lawyers play and
interests they serve. Its premise is that lawyers have different roles that,
in a given situation, may push in different directions, giving rise at times
to difficult questions about the best way to act to resolve the tension
between different professional values. 12 Resolving conflicts between
lawyers' various roles, especially between the competing obligations to
the client and the public, is the central professional challenge for lawyers
and for those seeking to regulate their conduct. 3 The ABA, as the
largest national representative of the organized bar, has drafted the
Model Rules, in part, to "prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts"
while recognizing that no set of rules is comprehensive, and that lawyers
must sometimes answer hard questions based on general principles.14
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 11, 12 (2013).
12. Id. at pmbl. 1, 9:
A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice. ... In the nature of law practice, ... conflicting responsibilities are encountered.
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.
13. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2013) ("Within the framework of these
Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules.").
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It is not obvious why professionals should have the right to regulate
themselves;'" for example, one would be skeptical if Wall Street brokers
claimed a similar right. One might justify the value of self-regulation in
various ways, including based on lawyers' superior expertise. But the
bar's principal rationale is that self-regulation is necessary to secure
individual lawyers' independence. 16 The fear is that, if the government
can make the rules for lawyers, it may make repressive rules, which
undermine lawyers' ability to perform as independent professionals.
Consider, for example, the response of the ABA and the European
bar in December 2011 when they perceived that the International
Monetary Fund was pressuring Greece, Ireland and Portugal to subject
their lawyers to non-lawyer regulation.' 7 A proposed law in Ireland
urged by the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central
Bank (the "Troika") would have established a Regulator: a regulatory
body comprised mostly of non-lawyers, to regulate lawyers' conduct and
handle discipline and complaints.' 8 When the U.S. and European bars
opposed this, they invoked the rhetoric of lawyers' independence,
explaining:
In our view, the establishment of the Regulator will be in clear breach
of one of the core principles of the legal profession: regulation
independent from the executive branch of the state-a principle
recognized in Europe, the United States, and internationally. It is the
cornerstone of any democratic society based on the rule of law and
also necessary for the sound administration of justice.
We are convinced that without a guarantee of independence-which is
fundamental to the profession-it is impossible for lawyers to fulfill
their professional and legal role.
Self-regulation is characteristic for the legal profession in Europe. No
15. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 20-21 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Conditions of Independence for the Legal Profession, in
THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 53, 55
(John B. Davidson, ed., 1985) (maintaining that society is best served when lawyers are independent
in the sense of "stand[ing] somewhat apart" from the client, both to better serve the client and "to
serve other, larger, and more diffuse interests than the client immediately recognizes and which the
client may even prefer to disregard," and that this ideal can be nurtured and pursued only "by a
profession whose members are so well guided by their personal sense of professional obligation to
the public that the public chooses to leave them largely free from outside regulation").
17. Letter from Georges-Albert Dal, President, Council of Bars and Law Soc'ys of Eur., and
William T. Robinson, Ill, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, Int'l
Monetary Fund (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocu
ment/CCBE andABA_1etterI-1 325686329.pdf.
18. Id.
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country has total and unrestricted self-regulation of the legal
profession. However, there is in all European countries that are
members of the CCBE a significant extent of self-regulation. In the
United States, there is in general regulation by the courts, which
similarly satisfies the principle of independence from executive
regulation.
We believe that independent regulation, conceptually, must be seen as
a logical and natural consequence of the independence of the
profession. It addresses the collective independence of the members of
the legal profession and is nothing less than a structural defense of the
independence of the individual lawyer, which requires a lawyer to be
free from improper influence, especially such as may arise from his/her
personal interests or external pressure (including government
pressure). 19
Are U.S. lawyers independent? Given the regulatory role of the
U.S. courts, the U.S. bar may be overstating or mischaracterizing its
"independence" to regulate its members. As the Model Rules' Preamble
concedes, lawyers' autonomy is "relative." 20 The late professor Fred
Zacharias, more pointedly characterized self-regulation as a "myth." 2 1
Historically, the courts regulate U.S. lawyers. When bar associations
argue for preserving lawyers' "independence," it is really advancing an
idea of separation of powers: that the courts should have (relatively)
exclusive authority to regulate lawyers as "officers of the court."22
Deep down, the bar might regard judicial regulation of lawyers as
merely the lesser of two evils, but at least outwardly it embraces the
concept. As I discussed several years ago, the ABA has a "strong
historic commitment to state judicial regulation," which it "resoundingly
affirmed. . . in 2002 when it adopted multijurisdictional practice
reforms." The ABA reaffirmed its support for judicial regulation more
recently when it "opposed federal administrative regulation of lawyers'
practice, in part, because federal regulation interferes with state judicial
regulation."2 3 While espousing its commitment to self-regulation,
19. Id. at 2.
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 12 (2013).
21. Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth ofSelf-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1189 (2009).
22. For a discussion of lawyers' professional identity as "officers of the court" and the
significance of the role, see Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, What is a Lawyer? A Reconstruction of
the Lawyer as an Officer of the Court, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 425 (2012).
23. Bruce A. Green, ABA Ethics Reform from "MDP" to "20/20 ": Some Cautionary
Reflections, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 6 (2009). See also ABA, Independence of the Legal Profession,
AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmentallegislative-work/priorities.
policy/independence of thelegal-profession.htmi (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) ("[T]he ABA
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beginning in the early 20th century the ABA has in fact promoted the
judiciary's expansion of its regulatory authority over lawyers. The ABA
has drafted model disciplinary rules, lobbied courts to adopt them, and
urged courts to establish or oversee more professional and robust
disciplinary processes to enforce them. 24 One can reconcile judicial
regulation with professional self-regulation if one regards the judiciary
as a specialized branch of the legal profession. Dana Remus recently
explored this concept from a different perspective in an article focusing
on the legal profession's role in regulating the judiciary.2 5 She argued
that in part by reconceptualizing the judiciary as a subset of the legal
profession, the bar in the 20th century asserted a role in regulating
judges, thereby "increasing its own power at the expense of judicial
power." 26  She described this as a shift from an earlier period when
"[1]awyers played an important quasi-governmental role as officers of
the court, but remained beholden to judiciaries as the regulators of the
practice of law." 2 7 Although Remus's principal point was that lawyers'
regulatory influence over the judiciary erodes judicial independence, she
also envisioned the relationship as weakening the bar's independence.28
Some bar leaders have acknowledged that the idea of lawyers'
professional "independence" is less robust in the U.S. than in some other
countries, but nonetheless see judicial regulation as far preferable to
executive or legislative regulation of the bar. For example, former
N.Y.C. bar president Evan Davis observed that:
[a]round the world the legal profession operates under varying degrees
of independence. In a few places it is still self-regulated in the sense
that it defines its own rules of ethics and disciplines its own members.
In other countries the bar is heavily regulated by the political branches
of government. ... In my opinion, it is very important for the bar to be
independent of the political branches of government. It has not been a
problem that in the United States the bar has come to be regulated by
the judiciary because of the judiciary's own neutrality; it would be a
huge problem if the bar were regulated by the Department of Justice or
opposes federal legislation or rules that would undermine traditional state court regulation of
lawyers, interfere with the confidential attomey-client relationship, or otherwise impose excessive
new federal regulations on lawyers engaged in the practice of law.") (listing ABA policies).
24. See, e.g., James A. Altman, Considering the A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2491-99 (2003); Zacharias, supra note 21, at 1160-63.
25. Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 123 (2012).
26. Id. at 145.
27. Id. at 134.
28. Id. at 151-55.
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by the various elected or appointed state attorneys general. It would be
much harder to resist either gentle or firm governmental pressure if the
government's lawyers decided how the bar in general or you, as an
attorney, in particular, should behave. 29
Two points should be noted here. First, if one assumes that
lawyers' individual independence in the U.S. depends on judicial
regulation, then lawyers have a strong stake in the preservation of
judicial independence from the executive and legislative branches. If the
judiciary is subject to outside pressure from other government branches,
then the judiciary may not be in a position to insulate the bar and
professional regulation. Consequently, in a system such as ours where
courts oversee the bar, the bar has an interest in promoting not only the
relative exclusivity of judicial regulation, but also judicial independence
in exercising that authority. For this, among other reasons, the bar has
an interest in promoting public respect for the judiciary.
Second, it is undoubtedly true that judicial regulation is preferable
to regulation by the executive branch, which is often a party to litigation.
The specter of executive officials regulating opposing counsel would be
disquieting. 30 But the question to which I will later return is this: Might
judicial regulation itself be problematic, albeit to a different degree?
The problem is most likely to arise when the judiciary seeks to resolve
tensions between lawyers' duties to the court and other obligations. The
judiciary is not a disinterested arbiter in that scenario. Further,
individual judges may overvalue institutional interests when they
interpret and apply professional standards. Should lawyers be more
independent from courts? Does the bar's endorsement of the courts'
regulatory role undermine lawyers' independence?
III. INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS' INDEPENDENCE
Independence of the bar is viewed as an individual attribute, not
just a collective one. But the term is conventionally used in two
seemingly conflicting ways. At times, "professional independence"
29. Davis, supra note 2, at 1291.
30. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L.
REv. 327, 369 (1998) (noting concerns when prosecutors bring criminal prosecutions of criminal
defense lawyers who represented opposing parties). Similar doubts were raised some years ago
when lawyers in the executive branch sought to exempt themselves from judicial regulation and to
regulate themselves. See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460,
469-89 (1996) (discussing DOJ's adoption of internal regulation meant to preempt courts'
professional conduct rules governing its lawyers' communications with opposing parties).
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means independence from clients. This can be either a state of mind,
e.g., detachment or objectivity, or something more tangible. At other
times, "professional independence" implies independence from the
pressures and influences of others who might compromise lawyers'
loyalty to clients. That is the principal sense in which it is used in Rule
5.4 of the Model Rules. 3 1
A. Independence from Clients
As Professor Gordon's article explores, critics of the U.S. bar for
more than a century have viewed independence from clients as an
important virtue and expressed concern about lawyers' lack of it.32
Abraham Lincoln might be identified as an exemplar of this virtue,33
which reflects a willingness to displease clients by, for example, telling
them what you believe to be true but they do not want to hear, or turning
down clients seeking socially unworthy, not merely unlawful, objectives.
The following story of how Lincoln advised a client was told by
Lincoln's law partner, William Hemdon, and then recounted by Illinois
Supreme Court Judge Orrin N. Carter in his 1915 volume on legal
ethics.34 Lincoln reportedly told the client:
We can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and
her six fatherless children, and thereby get for you $600 to which you
seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to
us, as much to the woman and children as it does to you. We will not
take your case, but we will give you a little advice, for which we will
charge you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man. We
would advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in
some other way.35
Lincoln could have accepted the representation; the client had a
colorable legal claim and may even have won. 36 In turning down the
31. Rule 5.4 has also been said to insulate lawyers from outside influences that might
compromise their ability to act consistently with public obligations, such as their duty of candor to
the court or their pro bono obligations.
32. Gordon, supra note 3, at 34, 48. See also Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 81-82 (2007) ("The bar as whole likes to think of lawyers as capable of
exercising professional judgment independently of client desires and capable of taking moral stands
that produce appropriate client behavior.").
33. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1, at 30-31.
34. ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1915).
35. Id. at 52 (quoting FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN, THE LAWYER 102, 239 (1906)).
36. Id.
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representation, Lincoln lost a fee and perhaps even a client. Acting in
accordance with his sense of professional duty, however, Lincoln gave
advice that he thought reflected the client's best interest as a member of
the community, if not the client's optimal financial interest.37
Contemporary legal ethicists have embraced the story and
appropriated it to various purposes.38 For example, my colleague
Russell Pearce and I did so in an article describing lawyers' role as
"civics teachers," 39 by which we meant, in part,
that when lawyers counsel clients about their legal rights and
obligations, and about how to act within the framework of the law,
lawyers invariably teach clients not only about the law and legal
institutions, but also, . . . about rights and obligations in a civil society
that may not be established by enforceable law-including ideas about
fair dealing, respect for others, and, generally, concern for the public
good. 40
Additionally, we suggested, lawyers teach by example when they
"address their own legal obligations in the course of a representation." 4'
Lincoln's story was principally about the lawyer in the role of
advisor. Others who discuss lawyers' independence from clients
similarly focus on the counseling function. A recurrent popular concern
is that when clients act badly, it is sometimes because of their lawyers'
failure to give independent advice that directs the client to broad
considerations weighing against the client's preferred course of
conduct-for example, advice that is not just legally or technically
accurate but that takes into account the spirit or purpose of the law or
broader societal concerns beyond obeying the law.42 William Allen has
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a
Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 49 (1995/1996); Robert
P. Lawry, Images and Aspirations: A Call for a Return to Ethics for Lawyers, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 199, 213 (2011); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 637; Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the
Deciding Lawyer: Human Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 N. DAK. L. REv. 19, 46 (2011);
Aziz Rana, Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1665, 1700 (2009).
39. Bruce A. Green & Russell Pearce, "Public Service Must Begin at Home ": The Lawyer as
Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2009).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1213.
42. For example, Judge Stanley Sporkin famously asked regarding wrongdoing by officials
of a financial institution, "where ... were the . . . attorneys when these transactions were
effectuated?" Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin,
J.). See, e.g., Symposium Transcript, After Sarbanes-Oxley: A Panel Discussion on Law and Legal
2013] 609
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spoken of "the duty of independence" in advising business clients about
compliance with the law, by which he means "the lawyer's duty to the
legal system and to the substantive values it incorporates."43 He says
that this is an "aspect of lawyer's duty that we do not much notice and
have not for a long time."44 Likewise, Archibald Cox suggested that
"[t]he independent lawyer' develops the capacity for taking a longer and
broader view than the first look of many clients engaged in pressing
immediate self-advantage." 45  Robert Gordon referred to the exercise of
this type of independence in advising clients as "purposive lawyering or
public-minded counseling." 46  One might view independence, in this
sense, as being in tension with the ideal of the lawyer as the "zealous
advocate."47
The Model Rules recognize lawyers' independence from clients,
emphasizing objectivity and broad-mindedness in advice-giving. Model
Rule 2.1 ("Advisor") provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation.48
The first part of the rule is framed in mandatory terms. Kevin Michels
has argued that the rule demands that lawyers may not tell clients what
Ethics in the Era of Corporate Scandal, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 67, 68 (2003) (quoting Father
Robert Drinan regarding the collapse of Enron). David Wilkins's article about the changing nature
of the corporate attorney-client relationship raises questions about the sustainability of the
independent advice-giving function, assuming it ever was realistic. David B. Wilkins, Team of
Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2067, 2085-89 (2010). Of course, some might question how often corporate lawyers are to blame
for corporate clients' questionable or improper conduct and posit that clients who engaged in
questionable conduct may have withheld relevant information from their lawyers or ignored their
lawyers' advice. Because of attorney-client confidentiality, it is sometimes impossible to know
what role lawyers' advice played in client decision-making.
43. Allen, supra note 3, at 3.
44. Id.
45. Cox, supra note 16, at 59.
46. Gordon, supra note 3, at 33.
47. Allen, supra note 3, at I1, 13. See also Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate
Lawyers After Reading The Cigarette Papers: Has the "Wise Counselor" Given Way to the "Hired
Gun "?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407 (2001). In contrast, Katherine Kruse has argued that the problem
is not that lawyers ignore broad societal values but that they ignore clients' own non-legal concerns.
Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 154
(2010) (identifying, as a central problem of legal professionalism, "the narrow construction of client
objectives in terms of legal interests and disengagement from client values").
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1. (2013).
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they want to hear or what will best advance their objectives, but must
"employ accepted professional standards of legal interpretation and
reasoning to interpret the law and apply it to the client's facts to form the
conclusions that will ground her legal advice."4 9
When the so-called "torture memos" were released, many perceived
that the authors in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
flunked this test in advising that water boarding was not torture, because
they told the Administration what it wanted to hear, not the conclusion
dictated by conventional principles of legal interpretation.5 0  Although
the authors escaped both internal Justice Department discipline and bar
discipline that some thought was warranted, there have been occasions
(though not many) in which other lawyers have been sanctioned for
failing to "exercise independent professional judgment and render
candid advice."'
In the realm of advocacy, in contrast to counseling, the professional
conduct rules are less emphatic about lawyers' independence. If one
took a strong view of independence in the advocacy role, lawyers would
have considerable discretion to serve public interests that may be in
tension with their clients' interests or desires. Consider, for example, the
nineteenth century understanding of an advocate's independence, as
expressed by John Inglis, Lord President of the Court of Session, in
Batchelor v. Pattison & Mackersy:52
[T]he nature of the advocate's office makes it clear that in the
performance of his duty he must be entirely independent, and act
according to his own discretion and judgement in the conduct of the
cause for his client. His legal right is to conduct the cause without any
regard to the wishes of his client, so long as his mandate is
unrecalled,.. . 53
49. Michaels, supra note 3, at 117. See also Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality
from Others' Conduct, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429 (2006).
50. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, AM. LAW., June 14, 2004, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005539346&TorturedReasoning&slretum2013033017
3309; W. Bradley Wendel, The Torture Memos and the Demands of Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS
107, 115-16 (2009) (book review); Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59
EMORY L.J. 333, 336-42 (2009).
51. See ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
287-88 (7th ed. 2011).
52. 3 R. 914, 918 (1876).
53. According to the "Guide to the Professional Conduct of Advocates" published by the
Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, the decision's "view of the powers and liabilities of an Advocate
has been considerably altered by practice and case law in succeeding generations." GUIDE TO THE
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ADVOCATES 1.2.2 (4th ed. 2007).
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The Model Rules provide hardly any discretion of this sort. In
general, the rules do not take a stand on whether a lawyer may disregard
a client's direction about how to conduct the representation, whether to
serve other interests or to better serve the client's interests:
On occasion . . . a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to
be used to accomplish the client's objectives. . . . Because of the
varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might
disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the
interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe
how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may
be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. 54
The rules timidly acknowledge one small aspect of advocacy in
which a lawyer, as advocate, may disregard a client's lawful interests or
instruction:
The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the
use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved
in the legal process with courtesy and respect. . . . A lawyer's duty to
act with reasonable promptness ... does not preclude the lawyer from
agreeing to a reasonable re uest for a postponement that will not
prejudice the lawyer's client.
Additionally, lawyers have some latitude to terminate a representation
when their view of the best course of action conflicts with the client's
view, or when the client's direction or objectives are anti-social (but
lawful) or at odds with other professional values: "If ... efforts [to
resolve disagreements with the client] are unavailing and the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw
from the representation.", And, as noted below,57 lawyers have limited
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2013); see David Luban, Lawyers as
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815,
824-30 (2005); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50
MD. L. REV. 213, 222-26 (1991); see generally CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005
(2006).
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmts. 1, 3 (2013); cf MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(B) (1980) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer may: (1)
Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of
his client. (2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, even though
there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.").
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2013) (citing MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2013)) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client
if... the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.").
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discretion to disclose client confidences to serve circumscribed public
ends.
In the end, the idea of lawyers' independence from clients is in
tension with the more compelling idea of the lawyer as agent of, or
zealous advocate for, the client, and not nearly as well elaborated in the
professional codes or literature. The idea is in part subjective and in part
aspirational, but it is not easily translated into specific conduct or rules
for behavior. In particular, the professional codes do not embody a
strong commitment to the idea that a lawyer may act contrary to client
interests or demands so as to serve competing professional interests.
Independence seems like something that lawyers exercise in the
interstices, where client interests and objectives are not in jeopardy.
B. Independence from Third Parties
"Professional independence" also refers to individual lawyers'
independence from third parties who might cause lawyers to
compromise their professional duties to the client or, to a lesser extent,
the public. John Adams's defense of British soldiers after the Boston
Massacre exemplifies independence in this sense. In 1770, British
soldiers who were pelted with stones and other objects opened fire on a
crowd, killing five. 60 Adams agreed to defend the soldiers when others
would not do so. 6 1 As David McCullough's biography of Adams
describes,62 Adams was "firm in the belief. . . that no man in a free
country should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial . . . As a
lawyer, his duty was clear. That he would be hazarding his hard-earned
reputation and, in [Adams'] words, 'incurring a clamor and popular
suspicions and prejudices' against him, was obvious. . ."63  Adams'
"virtuoso performance" in arguing that the soldiers had acted in self-
defense, won an acquittal of six of the eight soldiers put on trial and
spared the lives of the other two, who had fired directly into the crowd
57. See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2013); Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Permissive Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 277 (2006).
59. Robert S. Alexander, The History of the Law as an Independent Profession and the
Present English System, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT
THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 1, 15 (1984).
60. John Adams and the Boston Massacre, ACLU, (May 8, 2008),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/john-adams-and-boston-massacre.
61. Id.
62. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 65, 68 (2001).
63. Id. at 66.
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but were convicted only of manslaughter.64 Three years later, Adams
wrote in his diary:
The Part I took in Defence of Cptn. Preston and the Soldiers, procured
me Anxiety, and obloquy enough. It was, however, one of the most
gallant, generous, manly and disinterested Actions of my whole Life,
and one of the best Pieces of Service I ever rendered my Country.
Judgment of Death against those Soldiers would have been as foul a
Stain upon this Country as the Executions of the Quakers or Witches,
anciently. As the Evidence was, the Verdict of the Jury was exactly
right. 65
Adams' defense of the British soldiers is often invoked as an
example of lawyers' duty to defend unpopular causes.6 6 For example,
more than two centuries later, the American Civil Liberties Union and
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers gave the name
"the John Adams Project" to their efforts to oppose the military tribunals
in Guantanamo.67  Justice Black may have had Adams's example in
mind when he wrote for the Supreme Court:
Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are prized
traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which
the Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is this service
deemed more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an
accused too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a
member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an
offense which is peculiarly abhorrent. 68
Atticus Finch is, of course, another popular, albeit fictional, example. 6 9
Adams' defense of the British soldiers reflects a muscular idea of
professional independence. The idea embodies not only an expectation
64. Id. at 67.
65. JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 79 (L.H. Butterfield ed.,
The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1961) (1815).
66. See, e.g., Mark Brodin, What One Lawyer Can Do for Society: Lessons from the
Remarkable Career of William P. Homans Jr., 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 41, 42 (2011); Laurel E.
Fletcher, Defending the Rule of Law: Reconceptualizing Guantanamo Habeas Attorneys, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 617, 626 (2012); Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney
Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 81-82 (2011).
67. John Adams Project-American Values, ACLU (Apr. 4, 2008),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/john-adams-project-american-values.
68. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948).
69. See, e.g., Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using Outcomes in
Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 976, 991-92 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tending to
Potted Plants: The Professional Identity Vacuum in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 NEV. L.J. 703, 705 n. 11
(2012). But see Monroe Freedman, Atticus Finch, Esq., R.I.P., LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 20-
21.
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about lawyers' professional conduct but also about their professional
character. The assumption is that lawyers, as a matter of professional
commitment and training, have the backbone to defy self-interest and
outside pressures, including from friends and members of their
community, which would deter them from fulfilling their sense of
professional duty to clients and to the public. Adams did not need
buffeting from the public, nor did he receive it, because he had internal
professional fortitude.
How weak and flabby lawyers have become, at least in the ABA's
evident view, since Adams' day. In the ABA ethics rules, the only
explicit reference to individual lawyers' independence is in a fairly
trivial rule designed, it is said, to protect lawyers from the corrosive
influence of non-lawyers and corporations. 70 The principal and most
enduring discussion of professional independence over the past fifteen
years has been in the context of a debate over whether the rule can be
slightly liberalized to align the U.S. bar with that of other countries, in
which lawyers can have non-lawyer partners and law firms can seek
outside capital.'
Titled "Professional Independence Of A Lawyer," ABA Model
Rule 5.4 does not affirmatively define "independence" or establish a
duty to act independently.72 Rather, it identifies restrictions on lawyers
that are presumably designed to protect or secure lawyers'
independence, whatever that may mean. These include: (1) a restriction
on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer; 73 (2) a prohibition on practicing
law in partnerships or professional corporations or associations with
non-lawyers; 74 and (3) a requirement that lawyers ensure that third
parties who retain them or pay for their services on behalf of a client do
not interfere with their exercise of professional judgment.7 ' The
accompanying Comment explains that, "These limitations are to protect
the lawyer's professional independence of judgment."76
Although it is clear that lawyers are expected to be independent
from third parties, it is less clear what lawyers are expected to do with
their independence. The focus of Rule 5.4 is on preventing interference,
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).
71. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2196-98 (2010).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).
73. Id. at R. 5.4(a).
74. Id. at R. 5.4(b), R. 5.4(d).
75. Id. at R. 5.4 (c).
76. Id. at R. 5.4 cmt. 1.
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itself an underdeveloped concept.77 But interference with what? What
is "independence of judgment"? The rules do not define this attribute in
affirmative terms.
Rule 5.4 is essentially a conflict of interest rule. This was the
understanding reflected in much of the rhetoric surrounding the debate in
2000 when the ABA House of Delegates rejected an ABA commission's
proposal to liberalize the rule to permit "multidisciplinary practice.""
Opponents argued that restrictions on alliances with non-lawyers were
necessary to protect "core values," meaning that third parties would
induce lawyers to violate their agency duties to clients and their duties to
the court.79 In response to efforts of a more recent body, the ABA's
Ethics 20/20 Commission, to reexamine multidisciplinary practices
particularly in light of innovations in England and Australia, critics
invoked the rhetoric of professional independence as they had earlier. 80
77. See Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-
Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1519-22 (2000).
78. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-423 at 3 & n.6
(2001):
The prohibitions in Rule 5.4 are directed mainly against entrepreneurial relationships
with nonlawyers and primarily are for the purpose of protecting a lawyer's independence
in exercising professional judgment on the client's behalf free from control by
nonlawyers....
The rule was developed in the ABA House of Delegates during debates on the Kutak
Commission's Proposed Rule 5.4, which the House rejected. . . . Threats to lawyer
professional independence resulting from corporate ownership or public investment in
law firms led the House of Delegates to substitute nearly verbatim the provisions of the
disciplinary rules in the former Model Code of Professional Conduct for the Kutak
Commission's proposal. . . . In February and August 2000, concern that admission of
nonlawyer professionals as partners in law firms would interfere with lawyers'
professional independence and the preservation of the core values of the profession led
the House of Delegates to reject proposals to allow partnerships with nonlawyer
professionals and to direct that no change be made to Rule 5.4.
79. See, e.g., Robert L. Ostertag, Multidisciplinary Practice: Our Profession is Not for Sale,
18 GPSOLO 22 (Jan./Feb. 2001) ("Lawyers have, among others, three core values built into our
Codes of Professional Responsibility that the Big 5 want us to eliminate-our total independence
from outside influence in the representation of our clients, our undivided loyalty toward our clients,
and our obligation to maintain their confidences and secrets.. . . []f lawyer-controlled MDP firms
are to function solely on behalf of our clients, how may accountants meet their publicly directed
obligations when called upon to do so, without infringing on our own client-directed core values?
How can lawyers function for their clients when their independence and loyalty are necessarily to be
divided between their responsibilities to clients and their responsibilities to their accountant partners
or employers?").
80. In August 2012, the Illinois State Bar Association proposed a Resolution in the ABA
House of Delegates designed to preempt consideration of reforms to the ABA Model Rules that
might liberalize restrictions on lawyers' alliances with non-lawyers. The proposed resolution,
which was not adopted, provided:
The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership or control of the practice
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Rule 5.4 raises doubts about whether the bar still expects lawyers to
cultivate independence as a trait of character. If in an earlier day
lawyers could be counted on to withstand outside pressure in order to do
what they thought was right as a matter of professional duty, the premise
of Rule 5.4 is that lawyers need special protection against outside
influence.8 1
Lawyers in other countries, such as England and Australia, now
have the ability to collaborate with non-lawyer professionals in ways
forbidden by the U.S. rules, such as by taking in non-lawyer partners or
accepting non-lawyer investors in their firms. 82 So far, there have been
no documented reports of lawyers sacrificing their independence as a
consequence. Indeed, non-lawyers have been permitted to become firm
partners in Washington, D.C., without evident harm.83
Wholly apart from recent experience, one might be skeptical of the
of law by non-lawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession. The
law governing lawyers that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers
and from directly or indirectly transferring to non-lawyers ownership or control over
entities practicing law should not be revised.
ILL. STATE BAR ASs'N & SENIOR LAWYERS Div., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1 (2012).
The accompanying report maintained, in part:
Affirmation of these core principles and values is important now, particularly at a time
when technological advances and globalization are pressuring the profession to lessen its
commitment to the public and to professional independence. ... The evils of fee sharing
with nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit nonlawyer ownership can have the same
deleterious effect on lawyer independence and control as any other fee sharing with
nonlawyers. The American concept and practice of lawyer independence is as important
to proclaim and advocate throughout the world as is due process and the rule of law
abroad.
Id. at 2, 5.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).
82. See generally Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in
the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2843 (2012); John Flood, The
Consequences of Clementi: The Global Repercussions for the Legal Profession After the Legal
Services Act of 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 545-56; Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You
Can Keep It: How Technology and Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What
We Should Do About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 1008 (2012); Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing
the Delivery of Legal Services: On the First Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individuals, 73
OHIO ST. L.J 1, 7-8 (2012); Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise ofInstitutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1005, 1019-20 (2012); Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and
Australian Reforms With U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practices, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 15;
Carole Silver, What We Don't Know Can Hurt Us: The Need for Empirical Research in Regulating
Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1009 (2010); Heather A.
Miller, Note, Don't Just Check "Yes" or "No ": The Need for Broader Consideration of Outside
Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 311, 312.
83. See generally Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 217, 245-46 (2000).
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particular procedural protections codified in Rule 5.4 for at least two
reasons. First, one can rationalize almost any procedural measure as a
safeguard of "independence." For example, in England, the requirement
that barristers accept all cases, the "cab rank principle," without regard
to their view of the merits has been justified on this ground: "The
relationship with the independence of the bar lies in the impossibility for
the most part of associating certain barristers or chambers with certain
causes or attitudes." 84 In contrast, in the United States, the ability to turn
down an unworthy client is regarded as an expression of independence,
and lawyers are permitted to ally themselves with particular clients (as in
the case of in-house counsel) and causes (as in the case of lawyers for
interest groups). Likewise, in England, the requirement that barristers be
individual practitioners, not members of partnerships, is thought to
promote their independence.8 In contrast, in the United States, we
assume that working in a firm makes lawyers better regulated.86
Second, as I discussed in an article at the time of the MDP debate,
what passes as a protection for lawyer independence may largely be
designed to protect lawyers' monopoly.87  Rule 5.4 originated in
legislation aimed at forbidding lawyers from being employed by
corporations to provide services to members of the public. 8  The
proponents of the legislation had no evidence that the corporations then
supplying lawyers to clients were harming the public, and the
transparent motivation behind the legislation was to protect lawyers'
business. 89 Since that time, as Professor Gordon also observed in the
context of the MDP debates:
84. Alexander, supra note 59, at 1, 14.
85. Id. at 14 ("The rule that barristers are individual practitioners maintains a system in
which the lawyer is never committed to a sole client for work and fees but can advise impartially
and objectively. It confers upon the bar a most important attribute of independence, the right to be
free from any external pressure or fear of reprisals, based solely upon what the lawyer considers the
law to be.").
86. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.2 (2013); see generally Elizabeth
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A
Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise of
Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005 (2012); Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm
Partners as Their Brothers' Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 252 (2008); Ted Schneyer, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems:
Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
245 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REv. 799 (1992).
87. Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 1115 (2000).
88. Id. at 1120-33.
89. Id. at 1134-35.
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Historically, the sad if hardly surprising fact has been that the
organized bar's resistance to new modes of practice, though often
clothed in the high-minded rhetoric of protecting the ethical standards
and independent judgment of the legal profession, has been to a
considerable extent motivated by far less elevated desires to protect the
incomes of lawyers from economic competition or their status from
erosion by groups perceived as interlopers. 90
The rhetoric surrounding the opposition to liberalizing Rule 5.4
signifies one respect in which the bar has overvalued professional
independence. In much of the bar's rhetoric in other contexts, the
threats to the bar's independence come from the executive and
legislative branches of government or the general public. In the one
ethics rule with "independence" in its title, these threats are not
identified; nor are lawyers encouraged to stare them down.91 Rather,
the enemy at the gate of independence is envisioned as ...
accountants! 92  The rule trivializes the ideal of professional
independence as it diminishes legal professionals. Surely, the bar
could project a loftier ideal of independence and express greater
confidence in lawyers' fortitude.
IV. INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS' INDEPENDENCE FROM THE JUDICIARY
One aspect of "professional independence" that has largely dropped
out of the professional discourse is the idea of independence not simply
from clients and third parties in general, but from the judiciary in
particular. Dana Remus addressed this idea to a limited extent while
examining the profession's role in regulating the judiciary, 93 which she
90. Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Professor, Yale Law School, to Sherwin P. Simmons,
Chair, ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (May 21, 1999). After surveying the meanings
of professional independence, Professor Gordon concluded his letter: "[T]here are surely better
ways of protecting professional independence than by restricting the development of forms of multi-
disciplinary practice that promise many benefits in innovation and cost-effective services to clients
and consumers." Id. See also Paton, supra note 71.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).
92. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul
Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. Rev. 1097
(2000); Ostertag, supra note 79; see generally Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary
Practices: Are They Already among Us?, 53 ALA. L. REv. 639 (2002); Dave Foster, Comment, Get
Off My Turfi Attorneys Fight Accountants over Whether to Allow Multidisciplinary Practice, 31
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1353 (2000); John Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revises Ethics Rules to Permit
Limited MDPs: A Critical Analysis of the New York Approach, the Future of the MDP Debate After
Enron, and Recommendations for Other Jurisdictions, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 151 (2003);
Stuart S. Prince, Comment, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA 's Misguided Quash of the MDP
Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 245 (2000).
93. Remus, supra note 25, at 145-152.
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saw as expanding the bar's institutional power vis-a-vis judges. But this
turn does not necessarily mean that power also shifted to individual
lawyers in relationship to judges. On the contrary, during the same
period that the bar helped develop rules and regulatory institutions to
govern individual judges, it helped expand the judiciary's regulatory
influence over individual lawyers by drafting model professional
conduct rules for the courts' adoption, and promoting more aggressive
formal discipline of lawyers under the courts' ultimate oversight. 9 4 It
might be fair to say that as institutions of the bench and the bar have
increased their influence over each other's individual members, both
individual judges and individual lawyers have experienced a loss of
autonomy.
For lawyers, professional independence is in tension with judicial
regulation of the bar. Independence from the judiciary might include
freedom not only to criticize judges, but also, at times, to defy them.
Notwithstanding courts' regulatory authority, freedom from the judiciary
would also allow lawyers to resolve, as a matter of professional
conscience, how to balance conflicting obligations to clients and the
public.
Andrew Hamilton might serve as an exemplar of the independent
lawyer in this respect.95 In 1735, he agreed to defend a New York
publisher, John Peter Zenger, for the seditious libel of the Governor of
New York, after two other defense lawyers were disbarred for
challenging the trial judge's authority to preside. 96  The defense
conceded that Zenger had published the writings in question, which
criticized the Governor by innuendo. 97 The truth of the criticisms was
not a defense, according to the trial judge, who ultimately directed the
jury to enter a special verdict of guilty. 9 8  Nonetheless, defying the
94. See generally Altman, supra note 24, at 2492; Green & Roiphe, supra note 6, at 525-26.
95. Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389, 1449
(1992) (maintaining that the NACDL's references to the story exemplifies a "central and recurring
theme in the profession's narratives portray[ing] the lawyer as champion, defending the client's life
and liberty against the government, which is portrayed as oppressor, willing, ready and able to use
its power to destroy the individual and the values society holds dear"); see also Fred C. Zacharias,
Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1314-15 (1995)
("The concept of professionalism has existed as long as the bar has been organized. Our
visualization of early professionals is an idealized image: Abraham Lincoln, the repository of
wisdom and model of civility; [Andrew] Hamilton and John Adams, the guardians ofjustice against
public opinion.").
96. Zacharias, supra note 95, at 1315 n. 33.





judge, Hamilton famously and successfully urged the jury to return a
verdict of not guilty by arguing, contrary to the judge's instruction, that
to be actionable the libelous matter had to be false and that the jury,
from their own personal knowledge, knew the writings to be true.99
Hamilton has been credited with advocating for "jury nullification,
which the law forbids."' 00
The argument below is not that lawyers should flout judicial
authority other than in exceptional situations, or that the judiciary should
curtail its regulatory role. But the bar should at least contemplate
reviving the concept of independence from the judiciary and advocating
for lawyers to exercise a greater degree of independence from the
judiciary as exemplified by Hamilton.
A. Lawyers' Extrajudicial Criticism of the Judiciary
In the nineteenth century conception, lawyers' independence was
equal in importance to judicial independence and served as a
justification for limiting courts' authority to regulate lawyers.'0 ' A
principal aspect of lawyers' independence related to their conduct
99. See id.; see also Rebecca Aviel, The Boundary Claim's Caveat: Lawyers and
Confidentiality Exceptionalism, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1055, 1090 n. 145 (2012) (citing the Zenger trial to
illustrate that "the judiciary has certainly shown itself capable of the sort of reprisal and retaliation
that threaten the lawyer's independence as well as basic functioning"); James F. lanelli, The Sound
of Silence: Eligibility Qualifications and Article III, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 55, 67 (2009)
(discussing the effects of Hamilton's advocacy); Rebecca Love Kourlis, Not Jury Nullification; Not
a Call for Ethical Reform; But Rather a Case for Judicial Control, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1110
(1996) (calling Hamilton's representation "a celebrated example").
100. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
22.1(g) (4th ed. 2004) (defining jury nullification as "the power to acquit even when [the jury's]
findings as to the facts, if literally applied to the law as stated by the judge, would have resulted in a
conviction"); Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule ofLaw, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1150 (defining jury nullification as "a jury's ability to acquit a criminal defendant despite finding
facts that leave no reasonable doubt about violation of a criminal statute").
101. See, e.g., Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 13 (1857) ("[lIt has been well settled, by the
rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to
be removed. The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the
pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court
to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and
independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court, as the rights
and dignity of the court itself."); see also Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302 (1883) (Field, J.,
dissenting) ("What, then, are the relations between attorneys and counsellors-at-law and the courts;
and what is the power which the latter possess over them; and under what circumstances can they be
disbarred? There is much vagueness of thought on this subject in discussions of counsel and in
opinions of courts. Doctrines are sometimes advanced upholding the most arbitrary power in the
courts, utterly inconsistent with any manly independence of the bar.").
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outside the courtroom and largely outside the context of legal
representation, namely, their freedom to criticize the judiciary.'0 2
Among the influential judicial decisions on this theme was Chief
Justice Gibson's 1835 decision in In re Austin,103 which I previously
described as follows in a foreword to a collection of articles on lawyers'
role in a democracy: 104
The case involved the disbarment of almost the entire Fayette County,
Pennsylvania bar for sending and publishing correspondence that was
critical of and, in the view of the Court of Common Pleas,
disrespectful of the President of that court. Underlying the question of
whether the court had lawful authority to impose this sanction was a
question about the lawyer's role: as an "officer of the court," did a
lawyer have a duty to refrain from public criticism that the lawyer may
have intended to improve judicial decision making, but that seemed
102. See generally Angela Butcher & Scott MacBeth, Current Developments, Lawyers'
Comments About Judges: A Balancing of Interests to Ensure a Sound Judiciary, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 659 (2004); Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. The First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL
PROF. 161 (2008); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney
Speech, and Judicial Repetition, 97 GEo. L. J. 1567 (2009); Caprice L. Roberts, Note, Standing
Committee on Discipline v. Yagman: Missing the Point of Ethical Restrictions on Attorney Criticism
of the Judiciary, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817 (1997).
103. 5 Rawle 191 (Pa. 1835). The Supreme Court drew on the Austin opinion in Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 355-56 (1872), which held that judges are exempt from civil liability for their
judicial acts within their jurisdiction. The holding was based significantly on concern for judicial
independence, the Court reasoning:
[]It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration ofjustice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the
judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.
Id. at 347.
The civil lawsuit in question was brought by a Washington, D.C. lawyer, Joseph Bradley, who was
disbarred after accosting and threatening the criminal court judge before whom he had defended
John Suratt for the murder of Abraham Lincoln. In dicta, the Court took the view that, if the
allegations were true, there was ample ground for Bradley's disbarment for failing to "maintain ...
the respect due to courts of justice and the judicial acts." Id. at 341. It reasoned that even
extrajudicial conduct directed at a judge personally could be sanctioned if it interfered with judicial
independence, quoting Chief Justice Gibson's observation in Austin that:
No one would pretend that an attempt to control the deliberation of the bench, by the
apprehension of violence, and subject the judges to the power of those who are, or ought
to be, subordinate to them, is compatible with professional duty, or the judicial
independence so indispensable to the administration ofjustice.
Id. at 356.
Arguably, in a case posing a conflict between judges' and lawyers' independence, the former won
out.
104. Bruce A. Green, Foreword, The Lawyer's Role in a Contemporary Democracy, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 1229 (2009).
622 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:599
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE
disrespectful to the court? The lower court perceived that lawyers'
"office" implied an obligation of "good fidelity to the court," and that
this obligation called for the "observance of that trust, courtesy, and
respect, which is indispensable to the safe and orderly administration
of justice." The [trial] court considered the bar's public criticism of
the judge to be inconsistent with this role.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, emphasized the bar's role
in protecting the public from government overreaching. It viewed
lawyers' professional independence as intrinsic to this role, no doubt
recognizing that the judiciary was sometimes among the government
entities from which the public needed protection. "To subject the
members of the profession to removal at the pleasure of the court,"
Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson explained,
would leave them too small a share of the independence
necessary to the duties they are called to perform to their
clients and to the public. As a class, they are supposed to be,
and in fact have always been, the vindicators of individual
rights, and the fearless asserters of the principles of civil
liberty; existing where alone they can exist, in a government
not of parties or men, but of laws!
The legal profession's prescribed role did not mean that lawyers were
entirely free from regulation, including judicial regulation. But it did
imply limits on the courts' regulatory authority. Lawyers acting
outside the context of a legal representation or a judicial proceeding
were entitled to engage in the same lawful conduct, such as the
publication of nonlibelous criticisms of the court, that other private
citizens could undertake. 105
A later nineteenth century decision on this theme, Ex parte
Steinman and Hensel, 06 was authored by George Sharswood, the
Pennsylvania Chief Justice who is regarded as the father of modem legal
ethics. His published lectures on legal ethics profoundly influenced the
development of the first national ethics code, the 1908 ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.10 7 Decided in 1880, the case involved two lawyers
who edited a Lancaster newspaper that published an article about a local
criminal trial that ended in the acquittal of a local political figure.os The
article asserted that the acquittal "was secured by a prostitution of the
105. Id. at 1241.
106. 95 Pa. 220 (1880).
107. See Altman, supra note 24, at 2421, 2426-36; Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the
Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992).
108. 95 Pa 220.
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machinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the Republican Party," to
which the trial judge belonged. 109 Regarding the publication as a breach
of the lawyers' professional fidelity as sworn officers of the court, the
trial court disbarred them. But the state high court, drawing significantly
on the Austin opinion, concluded that doing so was an abuse of the
court's discretion.Io Justice Sharwood observed:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are
in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called
on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals
as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or
speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges
whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position
too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present
system.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908 by the ABA,
alluded to lawyers' independence from judges. The very first Canon
said that lawyers should "maintain toward the Courts a respectful
attitude," but lawyers have the right and duty to submit "grievances to
the proper authorities" when "there is proper ground for serious
complaint of a judicial officer," and "such charges should be encouraged
and the person making them should be protected.""12 Another Canon
stated: "No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should
restrain [the lawyer] from the full discharge of his duty" to support the
client's cause.1 3 Orrin Carter, the early twentieth century judge and
legal ethicist, drawing heavily on Justice Sharwood's opinion, discussed
lawyers' freedom to take issue with judges, at least outside the
courtroom.1 4 He wrote:
After the case is finished, any fair comment is justifiable. The
unwritten law of the profession is that a lawyer, when defeated, has a
right to cuss' the court, and this privilege is often taken advantage of,
many times for the purpose of relieving the lawyer himself of the
109. Id. at 236.
110. Id.at239.
111. Id. at 238-39.
112. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 1 (1963).
113. Id. at Canon 15 (emphasis added).
114. See CARTER, supra note 34, at 68.
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responsibility for the loss of the case.I1s
A Minnesota state supreme court decision held in 1908 that a
lawyer who personally criticized a judge in a letter to the press was
immune from sanction for expressing his opinion, no matter how
reprehensible.'1 6  The court distinguished the situation from one where
the lawyer writes directly to the judge. After surveying the relevant case
law, including the Austin and Steinman decisions, the court noted the
tension between the interest in judicial independence, which warranted
protecting the courts from unfair criticism, and lawyers' independence:
Few acts could be more disgraceful than the deliberate publication by
an attorney capable of correct reasoning of such baseless insinuations.
The case is of that sort which, considered of itself, might easily make
bad law. But the question presented is vitally important to the entire
bench and bar of the state, and even more so to its people, whose
servants we are. It concerns not merely the power of the court to
protect itself from undeserved censure, but involves in its
determination that independence of the bar, upon the preservation of
which civil liberty itself in large degree depends .... .
The court concluded that there were sufficient extrajudicial incentives
against unfairly maligning judges and courts, and that the lawyer had the
right like any citizen to publicly criticize the court." 8
Today, in contrast, the organized bar's mission, in significant part,
has been to defend the judiciary from attack, in order to protect the
independence of the judiciary.1 9 The bar has not cultivated or
encouraged lawyers' criticism of judges, has not defended it, and has
115. Id. See also Hon. Robert H. Jackson, A Testimony to Our Faith in the Rule of Law, 40
ABA J. 19, 20 (Jan. 1954) ("We maintain our right respectfully to criticize what we may think
errors of honest judgment by our courts and judges, but we can show no leniency toward judicial
partisanship, faithlessness, carelessness or irresponsibility.").
116. State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212 (Minn. 1908).
117. Id. at 216.
118. Id. ("[W]e adopt as our conclusion here these words of Justice Brewer: 'After a case is
disposed of, a court or judge has no power to compel the public, or any individual thereof, attorney
or otherwise, to consider his rulings correct, his conduct proper, or even his integrity free from
stain."') (quoting In re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72, 76 (1877)); see also id. at 215 ("In the terse, but
comprehensive, language ofMr. Justice Holmes: 'When a case is finished, courts are subject to the
same criticism as other people."') (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907)). See
also In re Hickey, 258 S.W. 417 (Tenn. 1923) (overturning contempt sanction against lawyer for
publishing article unjustifiably criticizing the court).
119. See, e.g., Resolutions and Reports, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/justicescenter/judicial-independence/resources/resolutions rep




discouraged it by subjecting some criticism to professional sanction.
ABA Model Rule 8.2 provides:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false
or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public
legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or
legal office. 120
This and other rules have sometimes been read very broadly, in a
manner likely to chill legitimate criticism; however, the bar has not
protested.
For example, in 2010, David Soares, the District Attorney of
Albany County, New York, was disciplined for publicly criticizing a
judicial opinion.12 1 The factual background is that a defendant under
criminal investigation sued Soares in Florida, alleging that the
prosecutor and his office were engaged in wrongful conduct in New
York.122 The defendant then successfully moved to disqualify Soares
from prosecuting him and to dismiss the indictment that grew out of the
investigation by persuading the trial judge that the prosecutor had a fatal
conflict of interest arising out of his role as a party in a civil litigation
brought by the accused.12 3 Regarding this outcome as absurd, the district
attorney wrote to a reporter:
Judge Herrick's decision is a get-out-of-jail-free card for every
criminal defendant in New York State. His message to defendants is:
"if your DA is being too tough on you, sue him, and you can get a new
one." The Court's decision undermines the criminal justice system and
the DA's who represent the interest of the people they serve. We are
seeking immediate relief from Judge Herrick's decision and to close
this dangerous loophole that he created.124
Soares's assessment of the trial court's decision was correct, and the
appellate court reversed it.12 5  His rhetoric was unexceptional.12 6
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 8.2 (2013).
121. In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2012).
122. Id. at 243.
123. Id. at 243-44.
124. Id. at 235.
125. Soares v. Herrick, 928 N.Y.S.2d 386 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2011), affd, 20 N.Y.3d 139
(2012).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (law's purpose was to close a
"dangerous loophole"); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (regarding potential
application of the exclusionary rule to no-knock entries of residences: "The cost of entering this
lottery would be small, but the jackpot enormous: suppression of all evidence, amounting in many
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Nonetheless, the appellate court sanctioned Soares for making a public
comment that, in its view, was prejudicial to the administration of
justice.127
As both a lawyer and a public official, the District Attorney might
have criticized the trial court decision, even in strong language, to let the
public know his office's view of the ruling and the steps it would take.
He did not have to stand by silently until appellate proceedings were
commenced and were resolved.1 28 But even if Soares's comments to the
press were excessive, imprudent or publicly undesirable, or his
motivations were impure, self-serving or illegitimate, one might perceive
the court's sanction as an encroachment on lawyers' professional
independence from the judiciary, and particularly, an encroachment on
lawyers' liberty to publicly criticize judicial decisions. Soares did not
confront the judge either in or out of court or otherwise threaten the
judge or disrupt proceedings.1 29 Nor did he libel the judge or impugn
the judge's integrity; he simply took issue with the decision.13 0 Notably,
the appellate court did not apply Rule 8.2, nor could it."' While
preserving a traditional restriction against libeling judges, the rule does
not forbid lawyers, outside the context of court proceedings or judicial
filings, from expressing highly critical, insulting or unmerited opinions
about judges' performance and decisions. Instead, the court invoked a
vague catch-all rule against conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice, without regard to the license implicitly granted by Rule 8.2 to
express negative and unfounded opinions.132 The fact that an appellate
court sanctioned the prosecutor without a moment's reflection about the
implications for lawyers' independence, or, for that matter, prosecutors'
independence as public officials, suggests one significant respect in
cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card").
127. In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233. Another decision along similar lines is Matter of
Westfall, 808 S.W. 2d 829 (Mo. 1991). Westfall, the St. Louis prosecutor, criticized the trial judge
for dismissing a prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. At a televised press conference, Westfall
characterized the trial judge's reasons as "somewhat illogical, and I think even a little less than
honest," said that the judge "really distorted the statute and I think convoluted logic to arrive at a
decision that he personally likes," and accused the judge of having "made up his mind before he
wrote the decision, and just reached the conclusion that he wanted to reach." A divided court held
that these statements amounted to sanctionable misconduct and reprimanded Westfall. Id. at 831-
32. By way of contrast, see Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012) (permitting a cause of
action for attorneys who were threatened with discipline for criticizing the judiciary).
128. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (recognizing the First
Amendment's application to attorney's public comments about a pending criminal case).
129. In re Soares, 947 N.Y.S.2d 233.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 244.
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which the idea of professional independence from the judiciary has
diminished in significance since Gibson's and Sharswood's day.
B. Lawyers' Disobedience of Court Orders
Questions of lawyers' independence may also arise in the
courtroom: How should a lawyer respond to a ruling that the lawyer
believes to be erroneous? The ordinary rule is that the lawyer must
comply, out of respect for the court's authority and as a matter of orderly
judicial procedure.' 3 3 But are there situations where, in the exercise of
independent judgment, it is ethical, even if not necessarily lawful, for a
lawyer to refuse? In such situations, should the bar support and
encourage lawyers who act on "professional conscience," as a matter of
independence? Even more so than the question of whether lawyers may
criticize judges, this question poses a tension between lawyers' duties as
officer of the court and the concept of lawyers' independence.134
In Maness v. Meyers,' the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
the context of deciding whether a lawyer could be held in contempt of
court for advising a client to disobey a court order for the production of
documents, where the lawyer believed that the order violated the client's
right against self-incrimination. The Court began by stating the general
principle that people must obey court orders:
We begin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of
courts must be complied with promptly. If a person to whom a court
directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal,
but, absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending
appeal. Persons who make private determinations of the law and
refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the
order is ultimately ruled incorrect. .. . The orderly and expeditious
administration ofjustice by the courts requires that "an order issued by
a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be
obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper
proceedings." . . . This principle is especially applicable to orders
issued during trial.... Such orders must be complied with promptly
and completely, for the alternative would be to frustrate and disrupt the
progress of the trial with issues collateral to the central questions in
133. John R.B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After
Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 238 (2002).
134. See generally Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a
Hodgepodge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 337 (1998); Palmer, supra note 133.
135. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
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litigation. 136
The Court then acknowledged one context where disobedience of a court
order is considered ethically proper, namely, when the party has a good
faith belief that the court order violates a legal or constitutional
privilege, e.g., the attorney-client privilege or the right against self-
incrimination.13 1
The Court recognized that a person directed to produce information
has "a choice between compliance with a trial court's order to produce
[information] prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that
order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if
his claims are rejected on appeal."' 38 In that situation, "[c]ompliance
could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts cannot always
'unring the bell' once the information has been released." 39 The Court
held that where the lawyer advised a client in good faith to test the trial
court's ruling by defying it, even though the appellate court
subsequently upheld the trial court's ruling, sanctioning the lawyer
personally would encroach upon lawyers' professional independence as
a counselor:
The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights, often
depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and skilled in
the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. . . . If
performance of a lawyer's duty to advise a client that a privilege is
available exposes a lawyer to the threat of contempt for giving honest
advice it is hardly debatable that some advocates may lose their zeal
for forthrightness and independence.140
The Court quoted a 1903 opinion similarly holding that a lawyer
could not be punished for erroneously advising a client:
In the ordinary case of advice to clients, if an attorney acts in good
faith and in the honest belief that his advice is well founded and in the
just interests of his client, he cannot be held liable for error in
judgment. The preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital
to the due administration of justice to allow the application of any
other general rule. 141
136. Id. at 458-459. See also In re Schofield, 66 A.2d 675, 679 (Pa. 1949) (quoting Scouten's
Appeal, 40 A. 481 (1898) and citing other authority).
137. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 466.
141. Id. at 467 (quoting In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1, 29 (1903)). In a recent case involving similar
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Ethics rules recognize that, at least from a disciplinary perspective,
lawyers have some leeway to test court rules that they believe are wrong.
Rule 3.4 ("Fairness To Opposing Party And Counsel") provides that: "A
lawyer shall not: . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of
a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists."1 4 2  But a judge may hold a lawyer in contempt of
court for willfully disobeying its order. Sometimes courts impose civil
contempt orders merely pro forma, designed to permit the lawyer who
has disobeyed in good faith immediately to appeal the court's ruling;14 3
if the lawyer's appeal is unsuccessful, the lawyer presumably will then
comply with the order and the order will be vacated. There is a tradition
of refusing to answer questions and going into contempt in order to
preserve a claim that noncompliance is justified by the attorney-client
privilege or the right against self-incrimination. But not all unlawful
court orders are subject to challenge in this manner.144 Moreover, even
if appellate review is available, a court may also elect to impose a harsh
crminal contempt sanction designed to discourage the lawyer from
appealing unless the lawyer is certain that he or she will be vindicated
and that the matter is important.14 5  Further, a court may leave a
contempt sanction in place, or even pursue additional sanctions if a good
faith appeal is unsuccessful, and particularly if the lawyer persists in
disobeying the court after exhausting opportunities for review.146
One might view a lawyer's willingness to stand up to the court,
notwithstanding a threat of judicial sanction, as an exercise of
professional independence. At the same time, one might argue that
courts should give lawyers latitude to do so. Some courts have done so,
as in two Ohio cases involving lawyers named Jones. 147 In one case,
issues, a Michigan state trial judge held a defense lawyer in contempt for defying the judge's
direction to remain silent and advising his client not to answer questions based on the right against
self-incrimination. Ultimately, the contempt order was reversed and a disciplinary complaint was
filed against the judge. Complaint Against Kenneth D. Post, available at
http://jtc.courts.mi.gov/downloads/FC90.formalcomplaint.pdf.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2013).
143. See, e.g., Seventh Elect Church in Isr. v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506, 512 (Wash. 1984)
("When an attorney makes a claim of privilege in good faith, the proper course is for the trial court
to stay all sanctions for contempt pending appellate review of the issue.").
144. See Pennsylvania v. Int'l. Union of Operating Eng'rs, 552 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1977).
145. Cf In re Grand Jury, 680 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2012).
146. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Rubin, 549 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1989) (lawyer held in contempt and
disciplined where the lawyer refused to represent a criminal defendant who planned to commit
perjury); see also People v. Stewart, 656 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1997) (upholding criminal
contempt prosecution of lawyer for violating court order to testify regarding a former client).
147. State v. Jones, No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008)
(vacating contempt order where a lawyer assigned to represent a defendant in the morning refused
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Brian Jones, was assigned to represent a criminal defendant named Scott
in connection with a misdemeanor assault charge.14 8 Although Scott had
been referred to the county public defender's office after his initial
appearance two months earlier, because of the way the appointment
system is structured in Ohio, it was evidently Scott's responsibility to
initiate contact with that office, and he did not do so until the day before
the scheduled trial date.149 Jones had been with the public defender's
office, and indeed out of law school, for only a few months. The next
morning, Jones informed Judge Plough, the trial judge, that he was
completely unprepared because he had been assigned to the case the day
before.15 0 Noting that three prosecution witnesses were present, Judge
Plough instructed Jones to take the next two hours to prepare for a trial
that would begin after lunch.'51  At the afternoon session, Jones
informed the court that he had not interviewed the state's witnesses
during the lunch break and again stated that he was unprepared for
trial. 15 2 Judge Plough found Jones in direct contempt of court and had
him taken into custody until the end of the day, when the judge ordered
Jones released on bond and set a sentencing date for one week later.153
Judge Plough admonished Jones for failing to file a written request for a
continuance after he was assigned to the case the day before, and
expressed his view that Jones should not have refused to follow the
court's order because if Scott had been convicted at trial, any
unconstitutional ineffectiveness of counsel could have been remedied on
direct appeal. 154
Jones's conduct, although in willful disobedience of a court order,
might be viewed as a significant expression of professional
independence by a lawyer who stood up to judicial authority, at
considerable personal risk, in good faith, to promote his own sense of
professional responsibility.'5 5 Significantly, this was not in the context
of an assertion of an evidentiary or constitutional privilege, where
disobeying court orders in good faith is generally considered legitimate
to proceed to trial the same afternoon); In re Jones, 724 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (vacating
criminal contempt sanction where a lawyer refused court order to turn over tape recording received
from the police, finding that the discovery order was erroneous).
148. State v. Jones, No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009 T2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008).
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id.






and contempt orders are often pro forma. Representatives of the
criminal defense bar supported Jones in his appeal, and ultimately, the
intermediate appellate court reversed the contempt conviction.' 56  It
found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance
where defense counsel feared violating the defendant's right to effective
representation and the ethical duties of competence and zealous
representation, and that "[d]efense counsel should not be required to
violate his duty to his client as the price of avoiding punishment for
contempt."15 7 But it was not a foregone conclusion that the court would
do so.
This illustrates an aspect of professional independence that is rarely
discussed, explained, analyzed, taught, or theorized. It is addressed
mostly in the context of criminal defense.'5 8 The literature of the legal
profession generally assumes that lawyers must obey judges, except
when court orders are stayed to allow for appellate review, and that is
undoubtedly true as a general proposition.159 Perhaps this is invariably
true as a legal matter, in the sense that judges, if they choose, can
exercise contempt power to compel lawyers to comply with their orders.
But from the legal profession's perspective, this does not have to be true
as an ethics matter. Sometimes, disobeying a court order is considered
professionally tolerable or even laudatory, as where the lawyer goes into
contempt to challenge an order erroneously calling for disclosures of
privileged information. 160 Sometimes, though, disobedience is
considered professionally improper even if, in hindsight, the court order
was invalid. And then there are cases in between involving a lawyer
who in good faith, but unsuccessfully, challenges a disclosure order, and
the lawyer may be punished afterward for contempt but perhaps not
sanctioned for a disciplinary violation.' 6'
156. See id.
157. Id. at 24.
158. See, e.g., Randolph N. Stone, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Responding to the
Judge or Supervisor Demanding Unethical Representation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 5, 13 (Rodney J. Uphoff, ed. 1995) (discussing State v. Lennon, 454
N.Y.S.2d 621 (1982)).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 498-99 (Wash. 1968) ("[I]f the attorney follows his
conscience and chooses the second alternative [namely, disobeying the court], and if this court
agrees that the desired information was privileged, then the contempt citation is dismissed and the
attorney vindicated. But in that second 'if' lies the attorney's dilemma, as the contempt citation
stands if this court holds with the lower court. Such a procedure might be justified if the application
of the attorney-client privilege to any set of facts were clear and definite; but certainly not when, as
here, the application of the privilege is rather obscure.").
161. See, e.g., In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1953):
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The question of when a lawyer ethically should or may stand up to
the court and when the lawyer should stand down is one that courts, as
regulators, have the least objectivity to resolve. In general, courts'
institutional interests are at stake. When the issue arises in a particular
case, the judge whose authority is questioned may perceive a personal as
well as institutional threat to judicial authority. Courts are in a position
similar to that of executive agencies when placed in the dual role as
parties and regulators, that is, the role that the bar fears most from a
perspective of professional independence. Lawyers collectively should
hesitate to cede this question to courts. But the bar has not made an
effort to delineate lawyers' proper function or to press their position.
The absence of robust discussion may reflect, in part, the bar's
reluctance to alienate judges by calling attention to their fallibility and
the occasional legitimacy of defying them. That is, the bar's stake in the
courts' status and independence may undermine the bar's willingness to
assert lawyers' individual independence from the judiciary.
We think this Court should not accept for itself a doctrine that conviction of contempt
per se is ground for a disbarment. . . . We do not recall any previous instance, though
not venturing to assert that there is none, where a lawyer has been disbarred by any court
of the United States or of a state merely because he had been convicted of a contempt.
But we do know of occasions when members of the bar have been found guilty of
serious contempt without their standing at the bar being brought into question. It will
sufficiently illustrate the point to refer to the tactics of counsel for the defense of William
M. Tweed. Those eminent lawyers deliberately and in concert made an attack upon the
qualifications of Presiding Judge Noah Davis, charging him with bias and prejudice. At
the end of that trial, after he had pronounced sentence on Tweed, Judge Davis declared
several defense counsel guilty of contempt. Not one of these lawyers, apparently, was
subjected to disciplinary proceedings in consequence of that judgment. Among them
were Elihu Root, later to become one of the most respected of American lawyer-
statesmen, and Willard Bartlett, destined to become Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals. These two were excused from any penalty, beyond a lecture on their ethics,
on the ground of youth and domination by their seniors-a rebuke perhaps more
humiliating than a sentence. One of the seniors who participated in the contempt, and
certainly one of its chief architects, was David Dudley Field. He later was elected
president of the American Bar Association.
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C. Lawyer's Independent Resolution ofEthics Questions
As exemplars of professional independence, one might say of
Lincoln, Adams and Hamilton, that they not only stood up to outside
pressures but that they did so in furtherance of their own understanding
of their professional role and obligations. 162  They exemplified
independence in a negative sense, resisting outside pressures, but also a
positive sense, exercising independent professional judgment about
appropriate professional conduct. They benefitted, of course, from the
limited amount of regulation at the time. 163
Today, in contrast, lawyers' latitude to exercise independent
professional judgment when it comes to the profession's tough questions
is arguably quite limited. The courts adopt rules, generally based on the
ABA Model Rules, designed to dictate lawyers' response.1 6 4 Naturally
the ABA endorses lawyers' conformity with the rules. But one might
argue that it is a further aspect of lawyers' professional independence
that lawyers decide hard ethics questions for themselves, in good faith
and as a matter of independent professional judgment, even, at times, in
contravention of applicable rules.' 6 5  If so, this is a further aspect of
lawyers' professional independence that the bar fails to recognize.
In the rule making process, the bar has not recognized that
professional independence is promoted by maximizing lawyers'
discretion to resolve hard questions for themselves. Consider, for
example, the highly debated issue of how lawyers should react when a
client who testified in a judicial proceeding later admits to the lawyer
that he or she has lied. 166 At one time the ABA rule was that the lawyer
had to keep the client's confidences.' 67 Later, the rule became that the
162. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37 (discussing Abraham Lincoln), 59-68
(discussing John Adams), and 95-100 (discussing Andrew Hamilton).
163. See Robert B. McKay, The Future of Professional Independence for Lawyers, in THE
LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 41 (1984)
(before the twentieth century, "lawyers were truly independent .... [T]he legal profession was
subject to no effective regulation except such limited restrictions as might be imposed by individual
judges upon individual lawyers who appeared before them").
164. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
165. Cf Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315, 336-39 (1987).
166. See Bruce A. Green, Lying Clients: An Age-Old Problem, 26 No. I LITIGATION 19, 20-23
(Fall 1999) (discussing evolution of the rule); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences
and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1988); Bruce A. Green,
Ethically Representing a Lying Cooperator: Disclosure as the Nuclear Deterrent, 7 OHIO ST. J. OF
CRIM. L. 639 (2010); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against
the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339 (1994).
167. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B)(1) (1980).
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lawyer must correct the client's perjury. Obviously, the question is a
hard one. Arguably, there is no right answer, certainly, no answer that is
right for all situations. Given reasonable arguments on both sides of the
question, an obvious approach would be to give lawyers freedom to
implement their individual intuitions and philosophies. But the bar,
despite emphasizing the rhetoric of lawyer independence, does not
regard questions such as this one as significantly implicating
professional independence.
This is not to say that rules afford lawyers no discretion. In some
situations, when lawyers have to resolve the tension between client and
public interests, the rules afford lawyers some leeway. 6 9 The
assumption is that lawyers will not exercise discretion self-interestedly
or arbitrarily,170 but that they will exercise professional judgment on an
ad hoc basis in light of the relevant facts and applicable professional
values.171 One set of provisions that operate in this way allows lawyers
to prevent or rectify client frauds that made use of the lawyer's
services.172 But the ABA adopted these much-debated limitations on the
confidentiality obligation only under pressure from the SEC in the wake
of the Enron corporate scandal.173 The SEC threatened to make
disclosure rules of its own for securities lawyers if the ABA did not
act.174 The ABA regarded the SEC's proposal as a threat to the bar's
independence, and although the ABA's permissive rules ultimately
expand lawyers' independence, the bar did not recognize that as a
positive feature. 175
The rules' generally constricted approach to resolving professional
conduct problems undermines the interest in promoting independence in
other aspects of lawyers' work. For example, one of the themes of the
literature on professional independence is that, in counseling clients,
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2013).
169. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 58, at 285-86.
170. Professional conduct rules leave latitude in other areas for lawyers to act in their own
interests or based on their own values, such as in deciding whether to accept a private client. See
Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. OF LEGAL
ETHICS 19, 25-26 (1997).
171. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 58.
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) & (3) (2013); see also DANIEL R.
COQUILLETTE, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS 182 (2005); Elisia M. Klinka & Russell G.
Pearce, Confidentiality Explained: The Dialogue Approach to Discussing Confidentiality with
Clients, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 157, 162-66 (2011); see generally Green & Zacharias, supra note
58, at 296-97.
173. See generally, Green & Zacharias, supra note 58, at 271-72.
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2.
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lawyers have become technocrats: lawyers tell clients what the law
allows them to do or help clients figure out how to get around the law to
achieve their objectives, but lawyers do not take a page from Abraham
Lincoln, telling clients when their objectives are socially unworthy.1 7 6
But when it comes to lawyers' own professional conduct, when lawyers
are called upon to advise themselves how to comply with their own legal
and ethical obligations, the bar's rules encourage lawyers to become
technocratic. The question for lawyers is not how to balance competing
professional values, but what do the rules require.177
The fact that the rules constrain lawyers' discretion might signify
that the bar does not trust its lawyers to reach the right resolution of what
the Model Rules refer to as "difficult ethical problems."' 7 1 Or it might
mean that the bar has greater confidence in its members' collective
ability to make general rules covering a range of situations ex ante than
in individual lawyers' ability to reach right answers on an ad hoc basis in
particular cases.17 9 Or the bar's reluctance to develop rules privileging
lawyers' professional independence might reflect that the bar gives
greater priority to other professional values, such as client
confidentiality.
The limited discretion afforded lawyers might also reflect the
paradoxical nature of "professional independence." What I mean is this:
Professional independence, in the sense of self-regulation, is
increasingly under attack from executive agencies, legislatures and
members of the public who do not believe that together the bar and
judiciary adequately police lawyers.' 80 The bar's claimed authority to
176. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 61-69 (2003) (discussing
earlier versions of the rules that allowed lawyers to decry conduct "unworthy of lawyer assistance"
and arguing the present limitation obstructs better lawyering); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090, 1113 (1988).
177. The analogy is not perfect. One might constrain lawyers' discretion regarding their own
conduct, because, in resolving their own ethical questions, lawyers cannot bring to bear the same
objectivity that they would employ in counseling a client. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword:
The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 245-47
(1998).
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 9 (2013).
179. Rather than developing rules to be adopted by courts and made enforceable, the bar could
develop unenforceable guidelines that reflected the bar's collective judgment while still giving
lawyers discretion. The ABA does that in the criminal prosecution and defense contexts, for
example. See generally Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093 (2011).
180. See Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea
of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1094-99 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA
Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 714-20 (1981);
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regulate its members depends on the perceived efficacy of lawyer
regulation. The persuasiveness of the bar's claim depends in part on
limiting lawyers' discretion. That is, lawyers must be well regulated, not
necessarily prudently regulated, but in the sense of amply regulated.
Even if we were to trust lawyers to reach correct decisions on their own,
the public would not share this confidence and would likely seek to have
other institutions fill the perceived vacuum. In other words, the more
independence the profession affords lawyers individually, the more the
bar's collective independence will be threatened.
Just as lawyers must occasionally address whether to violate a
seemingly unfair court order, they must sometimes decide whether to
disregard a professional conduct rule that, in context, appears unfair or
inapt.' 8t Generally speaking, the bar takes a dim view when lawyers
disregard disciplinary rules, and understandably, given the bar's interest
in a well-regulated profession. But there may be situations overlooked
by the bar where transgressions can be seen as laudatory expressions of
professional independence.
An example was a possible confidentiality violation by Staples
Hughes, a North Carolina lawyer, who, in the mid-1980s, defended a
man named Cashwell, who was one of three co-defendants on murder
charges.' 82 Cashwell repeatedly and convincingly told Hughes in the
course of the representation that Cashwell was solely responsible for the
two murders.' 83 After Cashwell was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment, one of the co-defendants, Hunt, sought to call Cashwell
to testify on his behalf, but on Hughes's advice, Cashwell asserted the
Fifth Amendment privilege, and Hunt was convicted.184  Many years
later, after Cashwell committed suicide in prison, Hughes spoke up
about his client's admissions.'8 5  Hunt's lawyers sought a new trial
based on Hughes' testimony and other new evidence, including new
forensic evidence; however, the state judge who presided over the
proceedings believed that Hughes was violating his confidentiality duty
William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the
Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1453-54 (2006).
181. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, Conscious
Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1307 (1998).
182. The following facts are taken from Professor Nancy Moore's affidavit in support of
Hughes and from newspaper accounts, including Titan Barksdale, Lawyer's Revelation of
Confession May Ruin Him, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C), Jan. 2, 2011, at IA, 14A.






to the deceased client and threatened to refer Hughes to the disciplinary
authorities if Hughes testified.'86  Only two states have an explicit
exception to their confidentiality rules allowing disclosures to prevent a
wrongful conviction or punishment,'87 and North Carolina is not one of
them. There are strong competing interests on both sides of the
question.' 88  Hughes resolved the question on his own and testified,
arguably in defiance of the applicable ethics rule, and certainly in
disregard of the judge's threat.' 8 9  After studying the matter, the state
disciplinary authority ultimately decided not to institute charges. 190
Arguably, the bar should encourage lawyers like Hughes to risk
violating a rule to implement a good faith and considered judgment
about the optimal resolution of a professional conduct question that the
rule's drafters did not closely consider. Obviously, lawyers should be
circumspect about testing rules. Lawyers should be law abiding.
Beyond that, the professional conduct rules reflect a judicial consensus,
based on the collective views of lawyers who have studied a question,
and the rules are generally worthy of respect. Lawyers addressing their
own conduct in context are less objective and detached than rule makers.
But rules are not perfect and have limitations. They do not necessarily
anticipate every problem lawyers face or may lead to unfair results for
unanticipated reasons. If the bar took a strong view of professional
independence, it might open a conversation about when lawyers might
legitimately violate professional conduct rules. But that is an
inconvenient conversation for the bar, which sponsors the professional
conduct rules and promotes their enforcement while currying favor with
the judiciary.
186. Id.
187. See ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)(C) (2009); MASS. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2013); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 64 (2000).
188. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Confidentiality and Wrongful
Incarceration, 23 CRIM. JUST. 46, 46-49 (2008) (supporting an expansion of the exceptions to
confidentiality); Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 391,
395-403 (same); Inbal Hasbani, Comment, When the Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by a
Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
277 (2010) (arguing an expansion of the exception is dangerous).
189. See James E. Molitemo, Rectifying Wrongful Convictions: May a Lawyer Reveal Her
Client's Confidences to Rectify the Wrongful Conviction ofAnother, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811,
820-21 (2011).
190. Academic literature suggests that it is rare for lawyers publicly to violate ethics rules as a
matter of professional conscience, i.e., to act in "civil disobedience" of the rules. See Robert B.
Palumbo, Comment, Within Each Lawyer's Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, and Attorney
Civil Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1068 & n.59 (2005).
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V. CONCLUSION
The ABA sees professional independence as an important value.
But some uses of the term tend to trivialize the concept. The ABA is
right to react when the professional independence of a foreign bar is
threatened by an oppressive government abroad.' 9' But the ABA has
expressed similar concern that the U.S. bar's professional independence
is threatened by accountants at home.192 One might be skeptical of both
the ABA's use of the term in the title of a professional conduct rule that
is essentially a conflict of interest rule and the bar's invocation of the
concept in the context of debates over whether to liberalize that rule to
permit multidisciplinary practices.' 93
At the same time, both the bar's rules and its rhetoric tend to
undervalue an aspect of professional independence that may have been
taken more seriously in the nineteenth century, namely, independence
from the judiciary.194 Perhaps, as the bar has succeeded in one of its
early projects, raising judicial standards, 9 5 the need to be able to
criticize or challenge judges has diminished. But the bar may also be
motivated by its recognition that its influence over the regulation of
lawyers derives from the judiciary. To implement its vision of the
optimal professional norms, the bar must persuade courts to adopt and
enforce its model rules. Model rules that encouraged lawyer criticism of
judges or lawyer defiance of judges' rules and rulings would undermine
the courts' institutional self-interest and ultimately hold little appeal for
the courts.
Although the bar portrays a symbiotic relationship between the
profession's institutional independence (in the sense of self-regulation)
and the independence of individual lawyers,' 96 there is also a tension
between these two concepts, insofar as individual lawyers might seek
independence from the judiciary. Promoting lawyers' institutional
independence from other government agencies requires encouraging
judicial independence and public respect for the judiciary, which would
in turn be undermined by a robust idea of professional independence
from the judiciary.
191. See supra note II and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
194. See supra part IV.
195. See note 94 and accompanying text; Remus, supra note 25, at 130-39.
196. See supra part I.
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